FEDERALIST No. 1



General Introduction

For the Independent Journal.

Saturday, October 27, 1787



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:



AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting

federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new

Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its

own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the

existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it

is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting

in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been

reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to

decide the important question, whether societies of men are really

capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and

choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their

political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in

the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be

regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong

election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be

considered as the general misfortune of mankind.



This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of

patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good

men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be

directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and

unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this

is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The

plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests,

innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its

discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views,

passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.



Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution

will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest

of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may

hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the

offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted

ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize

themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter

themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of

the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under

one government.



It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature.

I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve

indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their

situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious

views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated

by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the

opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its

appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not

respectable -- the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived

jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes

which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many

occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right

side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance,

if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who

are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any

controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be

drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who

advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their

antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition,

and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate

as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a

question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing

could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all

times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion,

it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword.

Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.



And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have

already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all

former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and

malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the

opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually

hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the

number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the

bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and

efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a

temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty.

An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which

is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be

represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity

at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one

hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble

enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and

illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that

the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that,

in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their

interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more

often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the

people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and

efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been

found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the

latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of

republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an

obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending

tyrants.



In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my

fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts,

from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the

utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which

may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same

time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed

from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my

countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive

consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it.

I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your

dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel.

I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have

decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely

lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness

of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply

professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my

own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by

all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace

the cause of truth.



I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting

particulars: 



THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY

OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A

GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE

ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO

THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN

STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS

ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT,

TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.



In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a

satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their

appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.



It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the

utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts

of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be

imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it

whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new

Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any

general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate

confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.[1] This doctrine will,

in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough

to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to

those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the

alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of

the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the

advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers,

to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall

accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.



PUBLIUS



1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held

out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution.