FEDERALIST No. 3



The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)

For the Independent Journal.

Saturday, November 3, 1787



JAY



To the People of the State of New York:



IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the

Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily

persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their

interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect

for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and

uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly

united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for

all general and national purposes.



The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear

to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that

they are cogent and conclusive.



Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary

to direct their attention, that of providing for their SAFETY seems to

be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a great

variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords

great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and

comprehensively.



At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the

preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from

FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND arising

from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is

proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to

examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial

Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best

security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad.



The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will

always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the

causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If this

remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes

of war are likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America;

for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the

fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union tends most to

preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.



The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation

of treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties

with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia,

are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also

extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect

to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to

attend to.



It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the

laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident

that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national

government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by

three or four distinct confederacies.



Because when once an efficient national government is established, the

best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will

generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or

other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or

senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more

general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications

will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national

government, -- especially as it will have the widest field for choice,

and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon

in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration,

the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national

government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of

individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to

other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us.



Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of

treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in

one sense and executed in the same manner, -- whereas, adjudications on

the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four

confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as

well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by

different and independent governments, as from the different local laws

and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the

convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and

judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national

government, cannot be too much commended.



Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the

governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and

justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and

consequently having little or no influence on the national government,

the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be

preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great

weight to this reasoning.



Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to

resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do,

result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great

number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able,

if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the

aggressors. But the national government, not being affected by those

local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong

themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its

commission by others.



So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of

treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are

less to be apprehended under one general government than under several

lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of

the people.



As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful

violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national

government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort

than can be derived from any other quarter.



Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and

interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the

Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of

the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several

instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper

conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to

restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of

many innocent inhabitants.



The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some

States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more

immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be

those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of

apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence, to

excite war with these nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate

that danger as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will not

be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately

interested.



But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national

government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and

settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that

respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly

than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men,

naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their

acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The

national government, in such cases, will not be affected by this pride,

but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on

the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which

threaten them.



Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and

compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united

nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State

or confederacy of little consideration or power.



In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,

endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge,

or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to FRANCE,

to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to

it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded

or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any

other POWERFUL nation?



PUBLIUS