FEDERALIST No. 5



The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)

For the Independent Journal.

Saturday, November 10, 1787



JAY



To the People of the State of New York:



QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch

Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then

forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall

present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and

perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will

secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities

amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two

kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this

union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all

apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS

ENEMIES." "We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in

this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy

conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and

future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies,

who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO

PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION."



It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at

home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more

to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within

ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.



The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the

best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by

their experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although

it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island

should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided

into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in

quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest

with respect to the continental nations was really the same, yet by the

arts and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies

were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were

far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and

assisting to each other.



Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four

nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies

arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined

in affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests,"

envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and

the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general

interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and

pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always be

either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant

apprehension of them.



The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot

reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal

footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at

first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance

can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local

circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to

impede its progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that

superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the

government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality

in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be

presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight

would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long

succession of years.



Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it

would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the

scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors,

that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear.

Both those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote,

whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and would also

restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her

prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her to discern

these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose

confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally

unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing

is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious

jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.



The North is generally the region of strength, and many local

circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed

confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably

more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become

evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and

sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did

in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash

conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey

in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more

delicate neighbors.



They who well consider the history of similar divisions and

confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in

contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be

borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on

the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries;

in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which

some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH

OTHER.



From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly

mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be

formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination

and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to

put and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign

enemies.



When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were

formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces

against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT

NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to

regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities

are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties

be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create

different interests, and of course different degrees of political

attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it

might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the

SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the

NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and

friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would

not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and

fulfilled with perfect good faith.



Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring

nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly

passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering

our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these

confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant

nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to

guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard

against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us

not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our

ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or

compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others make

in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they under the

same character introduce into the governments of those whom they

pretended to protect.



Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any

given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us

against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.



PUBLIUS