FEDERALIST No. 8



The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, November 20, 1787.



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:



ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States,

in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be

formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to

those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each

other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not

united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some

of the consequences that would attend such a situation.



War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence,

would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in

those countries where regular military establishments have long

obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of

Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy,

have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of

rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid

desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their

introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends.

The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places,

which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two

or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country.

Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and

delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would

penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as

intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively

small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid

of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises

of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of

the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires

overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide

nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and

little acquisition.



In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of

military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The

want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to

another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with

little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests

would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore,

would be desultory and predatory. PLUNDER and devastation ever march in

the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the

principal figure in the events which would characterize our military

exploits.



This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not

long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful

director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will,

after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life

and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant

on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to

liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a

tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe,

they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.



The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the

correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing armies, it

is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and it is

therefore inferred that they may exist under it.[1] Their existence,

however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most,

problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied,

must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent

war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant

preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or

confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon

an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to

supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular and

effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, and by

fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to

strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their

constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It

is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the

legislative authority.



The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States or

confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors.

Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous

governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often

triumphed over large states, or states of greater natural strength,

which have been destitute of these advantages. Neither the pride nor the

safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit them

long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority. They

would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had been

effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence. Thus, we

should, in a little time, see established in every part of this country

the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old

World. This, at least, would be the natural course of things; and our

reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are

accommodated to this standard.



These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative

defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the

hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they are

solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of

human affairs.



It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not

standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often

distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally

satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of

the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and

devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are

incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the

true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue,

which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver

and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the

offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have

produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered

disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the

inseparable companions of frequent hostility.



There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a

country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in

one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. The

rulers of the former can have a good pretext, if they are even so

inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be

maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely,

if at all, called into activity for interior defense, the people are in

no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not

accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies; the civil

state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the

principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness of the army

renders the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it; and

the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for

protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the

soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a

necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may

be exerted to the prejudice of their rights.



The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to

suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it

will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of

the great body of the people.



In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this

happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be

always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for

instant defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the

importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of

the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The

inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably

subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to

weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are

brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as

their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of

considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is

very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make

a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military

power.



The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An

insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure

against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of

a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head

against a sudden descent, till the militia could have time to rally and

embody, is all that has been deemed requisite. No motive of national

policy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tolerated, a larger

number of troops upon its domestic establishment. There has been, for a

long time past, little room for the operation of the other causes, which

have been enumerated as the consequences of internal war. This peculiar

felicity of situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve

the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the

prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had been

situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would have

been, by that situation, to make her military establishments at home

coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like

them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute

power of a single man. It is possible, though not easy, that the people

of that island may be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be by

the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually

kept up within the kingdom.



If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an

advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a

great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to

continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any

dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this

position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited,

and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most

probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we

should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the

continental powers of Europe -- our liberties would be a prey to the

means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each

other.



This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It

deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and

honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn

pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this

interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and

trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with

trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection of which would in

all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that

flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries

would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers, real,

certain, and formidable.



PUBLIUS



1. This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it

will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have been

taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to

be found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in America,

most of which contain no guard at all on this subject.