FEDERALIST No. 9



The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

For the Independent Journal.

Wednesday, November 21, 1787



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:



A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of

the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It

is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and

Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the

distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid

succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of

perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they

exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to

the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of

felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising

from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be

overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If

momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us

with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish

us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction

and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted endowments

for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly

celebrated.



From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the

advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms

of republican government, but against the very principles of civil

liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the

order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation

over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics

reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in

a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust,

America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices, not

less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their

errors.



But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of

republican government were too just copies of the originals from which

they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised

models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty

would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of

government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most

other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various

principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all,

or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power

into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and

checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their

offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the

legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new

discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in

modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the

excellences of republican government may be retained and its

imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances

that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I

shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on

a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the

new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such

systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single

State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great

Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns the object

under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the

principle in its application to a single State, which shall be attended

to in another place.



The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard

the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external force

and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon

in different countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the

most approved writers on the subject of politics. The opponents of the

plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the

observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory

for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised of

the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work,

nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they

subscribe with such ready acquiescence.



When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards

he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost

every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts,

Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be

compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms

of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point

as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either

of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting

ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous

commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the

miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who

have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been

aware of the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the

division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated

policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of

petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications to

extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue,

but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of

America.



Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as

has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that,

in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon

the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more

considerable MEMBERS of the Union, but would not militate against their

being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the

true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.



So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to

a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a

confederate republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of

popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with

those of republicanism.



"It is very probable," (says he[1]) "that mankind would have been

obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single

person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the

internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of

a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC."



"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller STATES

agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they intend to form. It

is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable

of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a

degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united

body."



"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may

support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this

society prevents all manner of inconveniences."



"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he

could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the

confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this

would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still

remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he

had usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his

usurpation."



"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states

the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they

are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on

one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and

the confederates preserve their sovereignty."



"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the

internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation,

it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of

large monarchies."



I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages,

because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments in

favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false impressions

which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to

make. They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more

immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of

the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.



A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a

CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The essential

characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its

authority to the members in their collective capacities, without

reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended

that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of

internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the

members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a

confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary;

they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed

happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the

manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in

their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions

to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that

there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown

in the course of this investigation that as far as the principle

contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder

and imbecility in the government.



The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an

assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states into

one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal

authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate

organization of the members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by a

constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in

perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it would

still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or a

confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an

abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the

national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the

Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very

important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every

rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.



In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES or

republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON

COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE. The

COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of

the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most, delicate species of

interference in their internal administration; for if there be any thing

that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is

the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this

association, says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate

Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the

distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this

enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the

novel refinements of an erroneous theory.



PUBLIUS



1. "Spirit of Laws," vol. i., book ix., chap. i.