FEDERALIST No. 13



Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government

For the Independent Journal.

Wednesday, November 28, 1787



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:



As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider

that of economy. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied

to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the

pockets of the people. If the States are united under one government,

there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are

divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different

national civil lists to be provided for -- and each of them, as to the

principal departments, coextensive with that which would be necessary

for a government of the whole. The entire separation of the States into

thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too

replete with danger to have many advocates. The ideas of men who

speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned

toward three confederacies -- one consisting of the four Northern,

another of the four Middle, and a third of the five Southern States.

There is little probability that there would be a greater number.

According to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise an

extent of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great Britain. No

well-informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy

can be properly regulated by a government less comprehensive in its

organs or institutions than that which has been proposed by the

convention. When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain

magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and the same forms

of administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent.

This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no rule

by which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the

government of any given number of individuals; but when we consider that

the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the supposed

confederacies, contains about eight millions of people, and when we

reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the passions of

so large a society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt

that the like portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same

task in a society far more numerous. Civil power, properly organized and

exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent; and

can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire by a

judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions.



The supposition that each confederacy into which the States would be

likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive

than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition, more

probable than that which presents us with three confederacies as the

alternative to a general Union. If we attend carefully to geographical

and commercial considerations, in conjunction with the habits and

prejudices of the different States, we shall be led to conclude that in

case of disunion they will most naturally league themselves under two

governments. The four Eastern States, from all the causes that form the

links of national sympathy and connection, may with certainty be

expected to unite. New York, situated as she is, would never be unwise

enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank to the weight of that

confederacy. There are other obvious reasons that would facilitate her

accession to it. New Jersey is too small a State to think of being a

frontier, in opposition to this still more powerful combination; nor do

there appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even

Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the Northern league.

An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own navigation, is her

true policy, and coincides with the opinions and dispositions of her

citizens. The more Southern States, from various circumstances, may not

think themselves much interested in the encouragement of navigation.

They may prefer a system which would give unlimited scope to all nations

to be the carriers as well as the purchasers of their commodities.

Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in a connection so

adverse to her policy. As she must at all events be a frontier, she may

deem it most consistent with her safety to have her exposed side turned

towards the weaker power of the Southern, rather than towards the

stronger power of the Northern, Confederacy. This would give her the

fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders of America. Whatever may be

the determination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy includes

New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to the

south of that State.



Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able

to support a national government better than one half, or one third, or

any number less than the whole. This reflection must have great weight

in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on

the principle of expense; an objection, however, which, when we come to

take a nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on

mistaken ground.



If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we

take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed to

guard the inland communication between the different confederacies

against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of

the necessities of revenue; and if we also take into view the military

establishments which it has been shown would unavoidably result from the

jealousies and conflicts of the several nations into which the States

would be divided, we shall clearly discover that a separation would be

not less injurious to the economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce,

revenue, and liberty of every part.



PUBLIUS