FEDERALIST No. 15



The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

For the Independent Journal.

Saturday, December 1, 1787



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York.



IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow

citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the

importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have

unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed,

should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of America

together be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy

or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the inquiry through which I

propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be inculcated will

receive further confirmation from facts and arguments hitherto

unnoticed. If the road over which you will still have to pass should in

some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will recollect that

you are in quest of information on a subject the most momentous which

can engage the attention of a free people, that the field through which

you have to travel is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of

the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which

sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles

from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be done, without

sacrificing utility to despatch.



In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of

the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the

"insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation of the

Union." It may perhaps be asked what need there is of reasoning or proof

to illustrate a position which is not either controverted or doubted, to

which the understandings and feelings of all classes of men assent, and

which in substance is admitted by the opponents as well as by the

friends of the new Constitution. It must in truth be acknowledged that,

however these may differ in other respects, they in general appear to

harmonize in this sentiment, at least, that there are material

imperfections in our national system, and that something is necessary to

be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support this

opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced

themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at

length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the principal

share in precipitating the extremity at which we are arrived, a

reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in the scheme of

our federal government, which have been long pointed out and regretted

by the intelligent friends of the Union.



We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last

stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound

the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which we do

not experience. Are there engagements to the performance of which we are

held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of

constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners and to

our own citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the

preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper

or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable

territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power

which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been

surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our

interests, not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent

or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor

government.[1] Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity?

The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty,

ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a

free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes

us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public

danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and

irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at

the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign

powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our

government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad

are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural

decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress? The price

of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be

accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can only be

fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are

so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct

tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the

friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to

borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this

still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of

money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither

pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded, what indication

is there of national disorder, poverty, and insignificance that could

befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we

are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public

misfortunes?



This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by those

very maxims and councils which would now deter us from adopting the

proposed Constitution; and which, not content with having conducted us

to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss

that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive that

ought to influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for

our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation. Let us at

last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths

of felicity and prosperity.



It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn to be

resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract

proposition that there exist material defects in our national system;

but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries

of federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy,

upon the only principles that can give it a chance of success. While

they admit that the government of the United States is destitute of

energy, they contend against conferring upon it those powers which are

requisite to supply that energy. They seem still to aim at things

repugnant and irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal authority,

without a diminution of State authority; at sovereignty in the Union,

and complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to

cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium in

imperio. This renders a full display of the principal defects of the

Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils we experience

do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from

fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be

amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main

pillars of the fabric.



The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing

Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or

GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as

contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though

this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the

Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the

rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment, the United States

has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money; but

they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the

individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that though

in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws,

constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice

they are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at

their option.



It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that

after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head,

there should still be found men who object to the new Constitution, for

deviating from a principle which has been found the bane of the old, and

which is in itself evidently incompatible with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a

principle, in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must

substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild

influence of the magistracy.



There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or

alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes

precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place,

circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and

depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts

of this kind exist among all civilized nations, subject to the usual

vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and non-observance, as the

interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the early

part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for

this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly

hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to

establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the

world, all the resources of negotiation were exhausted, and triple and

quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before

they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to

mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no

other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose

general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any

immediate interest or passion.



If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a

similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general

DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be pernicious,

and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated

under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least,

consistent and practicable Abandoning all views towards a confederate

government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and

defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternate friends and

enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships,

nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us.



But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we

still will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is

the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a

common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those

ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic

difference between a league and a government; we must extend the

authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens, -- the only

proper objects of government.



Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea

of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a

penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed

to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws

will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.

This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by

the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force;

by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first

kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity,

be employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is

evident that there is no process of a court by which the observance of

the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be

denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these sentences

can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an association where

the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the

communities, that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a

state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument of

civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the

name of government, nor would any prudent man choose to commit his

happiness to it.



There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States, of the

regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that a

sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the

respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the

constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the present

day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from the

same quarter will be thought, when we shall have received further

lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times

betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is

actuated, and belied the original inducements to the establishment of

civil power. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the

passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice,

without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more

rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of

this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of

mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to

reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action

is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one.

A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the

deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of whom

they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they would

blush in a private capacity.



In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power, an

impatience of control, that disposes those who are invested with the

exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to

restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that in

every political association which is formed upon the principle of

uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there

will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or

inferior orbs, by the operation of which there will be a perpetual

effort in each to fly off from the common centre. This tendency is not

difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power.

Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of

that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple

proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect, that the

persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the

particular members of a confederacy will at all times be ready, with

perfect good-humor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to

execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse

of this results from the constitution of human nature.



If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed

without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will

be little prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the

respective members, whether they have a constitutional right to do it or

not, will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures

themselves. They will consider the conformity of the thing proposed or

required to their immediate interests or aims; the momentary

conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its adoption. All this

will be done; and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny,

without that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons of state,

which is essential to a right judgment, and with that strong

predilection in favor of local objects, which can hardly fail to mislead

the decision. The same process must be repeated in every member of which

the body is constituted; and the execution of the plans, framed by the

councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on the discretion of the

ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have been

conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies; who have seen how

difficult it often is, where there is no exterior pressure of

circumstances, to bring them to harmonious resolutions on important

points, will readily conceive how impossible it must be to induce a

number of such assemblies, deliberating at a distance from each other,

at different times, and under different impressions, long to co-operate

in the same views and pursuits.



In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign

wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete

execution of every important measure that proceeds from the Union.

It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The measures of the

Union have not been executed; the delinquencies of the States have,

step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which has, at

length, arrested all the wheels of the national government, and

brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time scarcely

possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till

the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute

for the present shadow of a federal government. Things did not come

to this desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been

specified produced at first only unequal and disproportionate

degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the Union. The

greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of example

and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to the least

delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion than those

who are embarked with us in the same political voyage? Why should

we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common burden?

These were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand,

and which even speculative men, who looked forward to remote

consequences, could not, without hesitation, combat. Each State,

yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or

convenience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the frail

and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads, and to

crush us beneath its ruins.



PUBLIUS



1. "I mean for the Union."