FEDERALIST No. 17



The Same Subject Continued

(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)

For the Independent Journal.

Wednesday, December 5, 1787



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:



AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated and

answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the

principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may

be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too

powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which

it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes.

Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable

man can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation

the persons intrusted with the administration of the general government

could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that

description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State

appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce,

finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which

have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers

necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in

the national depository. The administration of private justice between

the citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of

other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which

are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be

desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable

that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp

the powers with which they are connected; because the attempt to

exercise those powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory;

and the possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to

the dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national

government.



But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere wantonness and

lust of domination would be sufficient to beget that disposition; still

it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the constituent body of the

national representatives, or, in other words, the people of the several

States, would control the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It

will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon

the national authorities than for the national government to encroach

upon the State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the

greater degree of influence which the State governments if they

administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will generally

possess over the people; a circumstance which at the same time teaches

us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal

constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be taken in their

organization, to give them all the force which is compatible with the

principles of liberty.



The superiority of influence in favor of the particular governments

would result partly from the diffusive construction of the national

government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the

attention of the State administrations would be directed.



It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly

weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon

the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his

neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the

people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their

local governments than towards the government of the Union; unless the

force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better

administration of the latter.



This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful

auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.



The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall under

the superintendence of the local administrations, and which will form so

many rivulets of influence, running through every part of the society,

cannot be particularized, without involving a detail too tedious and

uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it might afford.



There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the

State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear

and satisfactory light, -- I mean the ordinary administration of

criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful,

most universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and

attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and visible guardian

of life and property, having its benefits and its terrors in constant

activity before the public eye, regulating all those personal interests

and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more

immediately awake, contributes, more than any other circumstance, to

impressing upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem, and

reverence towards the government. This great cement of society, which

will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular

governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would insure

them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render

them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently,

dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.



The operations of the national government, on the other hand, falling

less immediately under the observation of the mass of the citizens, the

benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by

speculative men. Relating to more general interests, they will be less

apt to come home to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less

likely to inspire an habitual sense of obligation, and an active

sentiment of attachment.



The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the

experience of all federal constitutions with which we are acquainted,

and of all others which have borne the least analogy to them.



Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking,

confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of

association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose

authority extended over the whole nation; and a number of subordinate

vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land allotted to

them, and numerous trains of INFERIOR vassals or retainers, who occupied

and cultivated that land upon the tenure of fealty or obedience, to the

persons of whom they held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of

sovereign, within his particular demesnes. The consequences of this

situation were a continual opposition to authority of the sovereign, and

frequent wars between the great barons or chief feudatories themselves.

The power of the head of the nation was commonly too weak, either to

preserve the public peace, or to protect the people against the

oppressions of their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is

emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy.



When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike temper

and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight and

influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more regular

authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed over that

of the prince; and in many instances his dominion was entirely thrown

off, and the great fiefs were erected into independent principalities or

States. In those instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over

his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those

vassals over their dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the

enemies of the sovereign and the oppressors of the common people, were

dreaded and detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual interest

effected a union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had

the nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity

and devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests between them

and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor, and in the

abridgment or subversion of the royal authority.



This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or conjecture.

Among other illustrations of its truth which might be cited, Scotland

will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at an

early day, introduced into that kingdom, uniting the nobles and their

dependants by ties equivalent to those of kindred, rendered the

aristocracy a constant overmatch for the power of the monarch, till the

incorporation with England subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit,

and reduced it within those rules of subordination which a more rational

and more energetic system of civil polity had previously established in

the latter kingdom.



The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with the

feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the

reasons already explained, they will generally possess the confidence

and good-will of the people, and with so important a support, will be

able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the national government.

It will be well if they are not able to counteract its legitimate and

necessary authority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship

of power, applicable to both, and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions

of the strength of the community into particular DEPOSITORIES, in one

case at the disposal of individuals, in the other case at the disposal

of political bodies.



A concise review of the events that have attended confederate

governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an

inattention to which has been the great source of our political

mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong side. This

review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.



PUBLIUS