FEDERALIST No. 18



The Same Subject Continued

(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)

For the New York Packet.

Friday, December 7, 1787



MADISON, with HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:



AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of

the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic council. From

the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a

very instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the American

States.



The members retained the character of independent and sovereign states,

and had equal votes in the federal council. This council had a general

authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the

common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in the

last resort, all controversies between the members; to fine the

aggressing party; to employ the whole force of the confederacy against

the disobedient; to admit new members. The Amphictyons were the

guardians of religion, and of the immense riches belonging to the temple

of Delphos, where they had the right of jurisdiction in controversies

between the inhabitants and those who came to consult the oracle. As a

further provision for the efficacy of the federal powers, they took an

oath mutually to defend and protect the united cities, to punish the

violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious

despoilers of the temple.



In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply

sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances, they

exceed the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation. The

Amphictyons had in their hands the superstition of the times, one of the

principal engines by which government was then maintained; they had a

declared authority to use coercion against refractory cities, and were

bound by oath to exert this authority on the necessary occasions.



Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory. The

powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered by

deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities;

and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness, the

disorders, and finally the destruction of the confederacy. The more

powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination,

tyrannized successively over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from

Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The

Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-nine years; at a subsequent

period, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of

domination.



It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the deputies of

the strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the weaker; and that

judgment went in favor of the most powerful party.



Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia and

Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or fewer of

them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy. The

intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissitudes

convulsions, and carnage.



After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the

Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned out

of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The

Athenians, finding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer partisans by

such a measure than themselves, and would become masters of the public

deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece

of history proves at once the inefficiency of the union, the ambition

and jealousy of its most powerful members, and the dependent and

degraded condition of the rest. The smaller members, though entitled by

the theory of their system to revolve in equal pride and majesty around

the common center, had become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of

primary magnitude.



Had the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot, been as wise as they were

courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the

necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of the

peace which followed their success against the Persian arms, to

establish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy, Athens and

Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they had acquired,

became first rivals and then enemies; and did each other infinitely more

mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes. Their mutual jealousies,

fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the celebrated Peloponnesian war;

which itself ended in the ruin and slavery of the Athenians who had

begun it.



As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by internal

dissentions, so these never fail to bring on fresh calamities from

abroad. The Phocians having ploughed up some consecrated ground

belonging to the temple of Apollo, the Amphictyonic council, according

to the superstition of the age, imposed a fine on the sacrilegious

offenders. The Phocians, being abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to

submit to the decree. The Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook

to maintain the authority of the Amphictyons, and to avenge the violated

god. The latter, being the weaker party, invited the assistance of

Philip of Macedon, who had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly

seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had long planned

against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he won over

to his interests the popular leaders of several cities; by their

influence and votes, gained admission into the Amphictyonic council; and

by his arts and his arms, made himself master of the confederacy.



Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which this

interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a judicious

observer on her fate, been united by a stricter confederation, and

persevered in her union, she would never have worn the chains of

Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome.



The Achaean league, as it is called, was another society of Grecian

republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction.



The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much wiser,

than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly appear, that though

not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means equally deserved

it.



The cities composing this league retained their municipal jurisdiction,

appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The

senate, in which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right

of peace and war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into

treaties and alliances; of appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as

he was called, who commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and

consent of ten of the senators, not only administered the government in

the recess of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations,

when assembled. According to the primitive constitution, there were two

praetors associated in the administration; but on trial a single one was

preferred.



It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the same

weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this effect

proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left in

uncertainty. It is said only that the cities were in a manner compelled

to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was brought into

the league by Philopoemen, it was attended with an abolition of the

institutions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the

Achaeans. The Amphictyonic confederacy, of which she had been a member,

left her in the full exercise of her government and her legislation.

This circumstance alone proves a very material difference in the genius

of the two systems.



It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain of this

curious political fabric. Could its interior structure and regular

operation be ascertained, it is probable that more light would be thrown

by it on the science of federal government, than by any of the like

experiments with which we are acquainted.



One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians who take

notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the renovation of

the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the arts of Macedon,

there was infinitely more of moderation and justice in the

administration of its government, and less of violence and sedition in

the people, than were to be found in any of the cities exercising SINGLY

all the prerogatives of sovereignty. The Abbe Mably, in his observations

on Greece, says that the popular government, which was so tempestuous

elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of the Achaean republic,

BECAUSE IT WAS THERE TEMPERED BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY AND LAWS OF THE

CONFEDERACY.



We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did not, in a

certain degree, agitate the particular cities; much less that a due

subordination and harmony reigned in the general system. The contrary is

sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate of the republic.



Whilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, that of the Achaeans,

which comprehended the less important cities only, made little figure on

the theatre of Greece. When the former became a victim to Macedon, the

latter was spared by the policy of Philip and Alexander. Under the

successors of these princes, however, a different policy prevailed. The

arts of division were practiced among the Achaeans. Each city was

seduced into a separate interest; the union was dissolved. Some of the

cities fell under the tyranny of Macedonian garrisons; others under that

of usurpers springing out of their own confusions. Shame and oppression

erelong awaken their love of liberty. A few cities reunited. Their

example was followed by others, as opportunities were found of cutting

off their tyrants. The league soon embraced almost the whole

Peloponnesus. Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered by internal

dissensions from stopping it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm and

seemed ready to unite in one confederacy, when the jealousy and envy in

Sparta and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achaeans, threw a fatal

damp on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power induced the

league to court the alliance of the Kings of Egypt and Syria, who, as

successors of Alexander, were rivals of the king of Macedon. This policy

was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led by his ambition

to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the Achaeans, and who, as

an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and Syrian

princes to effect a breach of their engagements with the league.



The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to Cleomenes,

or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former oppressor. The latter

expedient was adopted. The contests of the Greeks always afforded a

pleasing opportunity to that powerful neighbor of intermeddling in their

affairs. A Macedonian army quickly appeared. Cleomenes was vanquished.

The Achaeans soon experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and

powerful ally is but another name for a master. All that their most

abject compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the

exercise of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon,

soon provoked by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The

Achaeans, though weakenened by internal dissensions and by the revolt of

Messene, one of its members, being joined by the AEtolians and

Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding themselves,

though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they once more had

recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succor of foreign

arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation was made, eagerly embraced it.

Philip was conquered; Macedon subdued. A new crisis ensued to the

league. Dissensions broke out among it members. These the Romans

fostered. Callicrates and other popular leaders became mercenary

instruments for inveigling their countrymen. The more effectually to

nourish discord and disorder the Romans had, to the astonishment of

those who confided in their sincerity, already proclaimed universal

liberty[1] throughout Greece. With the same insidious views, they now

seduced the members from the league, by representing to their pride the

violation it committed on their sovereignty. By these arts this union,

the last hope of Greece, the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into

pieces; and such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of

Rome found little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had

commenced. The Achaeans were cut to pieces, and Achaia loaded with

chains, under which it is groaning at this hour.



I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important

portion of history; both because it teaches more than one lesson, and

because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean constitution, it

emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to

anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the head.



PUBLIUS



1. This was but another name more specious for the independence of the

members on the federal head.