FEDERALIST No. 21



Other Defects of the Present Confederation

For the Independent Journal.

Wednesday, December 12, 1787



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:



HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal

circumstances and events which have depicted the genius and fate of

other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration of

the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our

hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and

satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely necessary

that we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the

disease.



The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is the

total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now

composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to

their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or

divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional mode. There is

no express delegation of authority to them to use force against

delinquent members; and if such a right should be ascribed to the

federal head, as resulting from the nature of the social compact between

the States, it must be by inference and construction, in the face of

that part of the second article, by which it is declared, "that each

State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, not EXPRESSLY

delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." There is,

doubtless, a striking absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind

does not exist, but we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing

that supposition, preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or

explaining away a provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of

the eulogies of those who oppose the new Constitution; and the want of

which, in that plan, has been the subject of much plausible

animadversion, and severe criticism. If we are unwilling to impair the

force of this applauded provision, we shall be obliged to conclude, that

the United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a government

destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the

execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the specimens which have

been cited, that the American Confederacy, in this particular, stands

discriminated from every other institution of a similar kind, and

exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world.



The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another

capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this kind

declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guaranty

from considerations of utility, would be a still more flagrant departure

from the clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a tacit power of

coercion from the like considerations. The want of a guaranty, though it

might in its consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately

attack its existence as the want of a constitutional sanction to its

laws.



Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in

repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the

existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may

rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the

people, while the national government could legally do nothing more than

behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful

faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no

succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends

and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation from which

Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind

are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the

issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a

Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism,

established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New

Hampshire or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York?



The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an

objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal government, as

involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the

members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the principal

advantages to be expected from union, and can only flow from a

misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. It could be no

impediment to reforms of the State constitution by a majority of the

people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain

undiminished. The guaranty could only operate against changes to be

effected by violence. Towards the preventions of calamities of this

kind, too many checks cannot be provided. The peace of society and the

stability of government depend absolutely on the efficacy of the

precautions adopted on this head. Where the whole power of the

government is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretense for

the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers of the

State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or

representative constitution, is a change of men. A guaranty by the

national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of

rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in

the community.



The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the

common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the

Confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of the national

exigencies has been already pointed out, and has sufficiently appeared

from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of it now solely with

a view to equality among the States. Those who have been accustomed to

contemplate the circumstances which produce and constitute national

wealth, must be satisfied that there is no common standard or barometer

by which the degrees of it can be ascertained. Neither the value of

lands, nor the numbers of the people, which have been successively

proposed as the rule of State contributions, has any pretension to being

a just representative. If we compare the wealth of the United

Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany, or even of France, and if we

at the same time compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate

population of that contracted district with the total value of the lands

and the aggregate population of the immense regions of either of the

three last-mentioned countries, we shall at once discover that there is

no comparison between the proportion of either of these two objects and

that of the relative wealth of those nations. If the like parallel were

to be run between several of the American States, it would furnish a

like result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North Carolina,

Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with New Jersey, and we shall

be convinced that the respective abilities of those States, in relation

to revenue, bear little or no analogy to their comparative stock in

lands or to their comparative population. The position may be equally

illustrated by a similar process between the counties of the same State.

No man who is acquainted with the State of New York will doubt that the

active wealth of King's County bears a much greater proportion to that

of Montgomery than it would appear to be if we should take either the

total value of the lands or the total number of the people as a

criterion!



The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes.

Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature of

the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of information

they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry, these

circumstances and many more, too complex, minute, or adventitious to

admit of a particular specification, occasion differences hardly

conceivable in the relative opulence and riches of different countries.

The consequence clearly is that there can be no common measure of

national wealth, and, of course, no general or stationary rule by which

the ability of a state to pay taxes can be determined. The attempt,

therefore, to regulate the contributions of the members of a confederacy

by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of glaring inequality and

extreme oppression.



This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the

eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing a compliance

with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering States would not

long consent to remain associated upon a principle which distributes the

public burdens with so unequal a hand, and which was calculated to

impoverish and oppress the citizens of some States, while those of

others would scarcely be conscious of the small proportion of the weight

they were required to sustain. This, however, is an evil inseparable

from the principle of quotas and requisitions.



There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but by

authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in its own

way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon articles of

consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in time, find its

level with the means of paying them. The amount to be contributed by

each citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and can be regulated

by an attention to his resources. The rich may be extravagant, the poor

can be frugal; and private oppression may always be avoided by a

judicious selection of objects proper for such impositions. If

inequalities should arise in some States from duties on particular

objects, these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced by

proportional inequalities in other States, from the duties on other

objects. In the course of time and things, an equilibrium, as far as it

is attainable in so complicated a subject, will be established

everywhere. Or, if inequalities should still exist, they would neither

be so great in their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor so

odious in their appearance, as those which would necessarily spring from

quotas, upon any scale that can possibly be devised.



It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that they

contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe

their own limit; which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end

proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue. When applied to this

object, the saying is as just as it is witty, that, "in political

arithmetic, two and two do not always make four." If duties are too

high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; and the

product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within

proper and moderate bounds. This forms a complete barrier against any

material oppression of the citizens by taxes of this class, and is

itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them.



Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect

taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part of the revenue

raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which principally

relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment.

Either the value of land, or the number of the people, may serve as a

standard. The state of agriculture and the populousness of a country

have been considered as nearly connected with each other. And, as a

rule, for the purpose intended, numbers, in the view of simplicity and

certainty, are entitled to a preference. In every country it is a

herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land; in a country

imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties are

increased almost to impracticability. The expense of an accurate

valuation is, in all situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of

taxation where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be

found in the nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not

incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences

than to leave that discretion altogether at large.



PUBLIUS