FEDERALIST No. 25



The Same Subject Continued

(The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)

From the New York Packet.

Friday, December 21, 1787.



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:



IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding

number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the

direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of

the primary principle of our political association, as it would in

practice transfer the care of the common defense from the federal head

to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States,

dangerous to all, and baneful to the Confederacy.



The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our

neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union

from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is

therefore common. And the means of guarding against it ought, in like

manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a common treasury.

It happens that some States, from local situation, are more directly

exposed. New York is of this class. Upon the plan of separate

provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole weight of the

establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the mediate or

ultimate protection of her neighbors. This would neither be equitable as

it respected New York nor safe as it respected the other States. Various

inconveniences would attend such a system. The States, to whose lot it

might fall to support the necessary establishments, would be as little

able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burden of

competent provisions. The security of all would thus be subjected to the

parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part. If the resources of

such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its provisions should be

proportionally enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm

at seeing the whole military force of the Union in the hands of two or

three of its members, and those probably amongst the most powerful. They

would each choose to have some counterpoise, and pretenses could easily

be contrived. In this situation, military establishments, nourished by

mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper

size; and being at the separate disposal of the members, they would be

engines for the abridgment or demolition of the national authority.



Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State

governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the

Union, the foundation of which will be the love of power; and that in

any contest between the federal head and one of its members the people

will be most apt to unite with their local government. If, in addition

to this immense advantage, the ambition of the members should be

stimulated by the separate and independent possession of military

forces, it would afford too strong a temptation and too great a facility

to them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the

constitutional authority of the Union. On the other hand, the liberty of

the people would be less safe in this state of things than in that which

left the national forces in the hands of the national government. As far

as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had

better be in those hands of which the people are most likely to be

jealous than in those of which they are least likely to be jealous. For

it is a truth, which the experience of ages has attested, that the

people are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights

are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least

suspicion.



The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to

the Union from the separate possession of military forces by the States,

have, in express terms, prohibited them from having either ships or

troops, unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that the

existence of a federal government and military establishments under

State authority are not less at variance with each other than a due

supply of the federal treasury and the system of quotas and

requisitions.



There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which

the impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the national

legislature will be equally manifest. The design of the objection, which

has been mentioned, is to preclude standing armies in time of peace,

though we have never been informed how far it is designed the

prohibition should extend; whether to raising armies as well as to

KEEPING THEM UP in a season of tranquillity or not. If it be confined to

the latter it will have no precise signification, and it will be

ineffectual for the purpose intended. When armies are once raised what

shall be denominated "keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the

Constitution? What time shall be requisite to ascertain the violation?

Shall it be a week, a month, a year? Or shall we say they may be

continued as long as the danger which occasioned their being raised

continues? This would be to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF

PEACE, against threatening or impending danger, which would be at once

to deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce

an extensive latitude of construction. Who shall judge of the

continuance of the danger? This must undoubtedly be submitted to the

national government, and the matter would then be brought to this issue,

that the national government, to provide against apprehended danger,

might in the first instance raise troops, and might afterwards keep them

on foot as long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community

was in any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive that a discretion

so latitudinary as this would afford ample room for eluding the force of

the provision.



The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on

the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a combination

between the executive and the legislative, in some scheme of usurpation.

Should this at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabricate

pretenses of approaching danger! Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain

or Britain, would always be at hand. Provocations to produce the desired

appearances might even be given to some foreign power, and appeased

again by timely concessions. If we can reasonably presume such a

combination to have been formed, and that the enterprise is warranted by

a sufficient prospect of success, the army, when once raised, from

whatever cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to the execution

of the project.



If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the

prohibition to the RAISING of armies in time of peace, the United States

would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has

yet seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare

for defense, before it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a formal

denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an

enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to

the government to begin its levies of men for the protection of the

State. We must receive the blow, before we could even prepare to return

it. All that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger,

and meet the gathering storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to the

genuine maxims of a free government. We must expose our property and

liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our

weakness to seize the naked and defenseless prey, because we are afraid

that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might

endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its

preservation.



Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its

natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national

defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our

independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have been

saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance of

this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a

suggestion. The steady operations of war against a regular and

disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the

same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and

vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the course of the

late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal

monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the

liberty of their country could not have been established by their

efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most

other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by

perserverance, by time, and by practice.



All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced

course of human affairs, defeats itself. Pennsylvania, at this instant,

affords an example of the truth of this remark. The Bill of Rights of

that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and

ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in

a time of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders in one

or two of her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops; and in

all probability will keep them up as long as there is any appearance of

danger to the public peace. The conduct of Massachusetts affords a

lesson on the same subject, though on different ground. That State

(without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the articles of the

Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic

insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the

spirit of revolt. The particular constitution of Massachusetts opposed

no obstacle to the measure; but the instance is still of use to instruct

us that cases are likely to occur under our government, as well as under

those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force in

time of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is

therefore improper in this respect to control the legislative

discretion. It also teaches us, in its application to the United States,

how little the rights of a feeble government are likely to be respected,

even by its own constituents. And it teaches us, in addition to the

rest, how unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public

necessity.



It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that the

post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the same person. The

Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea from

the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before served with success in

that capacity, to command the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to

gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to

their ancient institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of

investing Lysander with the real power of admiral, under the nominal

title of vice-admiral. This instance is selected from among a multitude

that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced and

illustrated by domestic examples; which is, that nations pay little

regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to run

counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians will be cautious

about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be

observed, because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws,

though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought

to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a

country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of

necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.



PUBLIUS