FEDERALIST No. 27



The Same Subject Continued

(The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to

the Common Defense Considered)

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, December 25, 1787.



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:



IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind

proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military

force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that

have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion,

unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons

upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the

latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a

presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise of

federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any

exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the

distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground

there is to presuppose that disinclination in the people. Unless we

presume at the same time that the powers of the general government will

be worse administered than those of the State government, there seems to

be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition

in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that

their confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be

proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It must

be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions

depend so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered

as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a

constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles and

maxims.



Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to

induce a probability that the general government will be better

administered than the particular governments; the principal of which

reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election will present a

greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people; that through the

medium of the State legislatures which are select bodies of men, and

which are to appoint the members of the national Senate there is reason

to expect that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar care

and judgment; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge and

more extensive information in the national councils, and that they will

be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of the

reach of those occasional ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and

propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently contaminate the

public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of the

community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify a momentary

inclination or desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction,

and disgust. Several additional reasons of considerable force, to

fortify that probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a more

critical eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited

to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory

reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal

government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to render it

odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no reasonable

foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union will meet with

any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need of any other

methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular

members.



The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of

punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the

government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power,

can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy,

be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment and to inspire the

LATTER, than that of a single State, which can only command the

resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State may easily

suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the government in

that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a

match for the combined efforts of the Union. If this reflection be just,

there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of

individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that of a single

member.



I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the less

just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more the

operations of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary

exercise of government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet

with it in the common occurrences of their political life, the more it

is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings, the further it

enters into those objects which touch the most sensible chords and put

in motion the most active springs of the human heart, the greater will

be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of

the community. Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely

strikes his senses will generally have but little influence upon his

mind. A government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly

be expected to interest the sensations of the people. The inference is,

that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens

towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension

to what are called matters of internal concern; and will have less

occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and

comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through those

channls and currents in which the passions of mankind naturally flow,

the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients

of compulsion.



One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the

one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using

force, than that species of league contend for by most of its opponents;

the authority of which should only operate upon the States in their

political or collective capacities. It has been shown that in such a

Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws but force; that

frequent delinquencies in the members are the natural offspring of the

very frame of the government; and that as often as these happen, they

can only be redressed, if at all, by war and violence.



The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the

federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will

enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the

execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to

destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the sources

from which they might proceed; and will give the federal government the

same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority which is

enjoyed by the government of each State, in addition to the influence on

public opinion which will result from the important consideration of its

having power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the

whole Union. It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws

of the Confederacy, as to the ENUMERATED and LEGITIMATE objects of its

jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance

of which all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in each

State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures,

courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated

into the operations of the national government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY EXTENDS; and will be rendered auxiliary to the

enforcement of its laws.[1] Any man who will pursue, by his own

reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive that

there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution

of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common

share of prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may

deduce any inferences we please from the supposition; for it is

certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the

best government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and

precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But though the

adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume that the

national rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good, or to

the obligations of duty, I would still ask them how the interests of

ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by such a

conduct?



PUBLIUS



1. The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend to

the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will, in its

proper place, be fully detected.