FEDERALIST No. 29



Concerning the Militia

From the New York Packet.

Wednesday, January 9, 1788



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:



THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in

times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties

of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal

peace of the Confederacy.



It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in

the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with

the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for

the public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the

camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage

of peculiar moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit them

much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions

which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity

can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to

the direction of the national authority. It is, therefore, with the most

evident propriety, that the plan of the convention proposes to empower

the Union "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the

militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the

service of the United States, RESERVING TO THE STATES RESPECTIVELY THE

APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE MILITIA

ACCORDING TO THE DISCIPLINE PRESCRIBED BY CONGRESS."



Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan

of the convention, there is none that was so little to have been

expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this

particular provision has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be

the most natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be

under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is

constituted the guardian of the national security. If standing armies

are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the

body to whose care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as

far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such

unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid

of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in

support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the

employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of

the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army

unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence

than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.



In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to

execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is

nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the

POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty,

whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his

only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which

have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much

calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair

dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath,

that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and

unlimited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority sufficient

even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as

much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd

to doubt, that a right to pass all laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute

its declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of

the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of

those laws, as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws

necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would

involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of

landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to

it. It being therefore evident that the supposition of a want of power

to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of

color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it,

in its application to the authority of the federal government over the

militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there be

to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of

authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when

necessary? What shall we think of the motives which could induce men of

sense to reason in this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between

charity and conviction?



By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are

even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of

the federal government. It is observed that select corps may be formed,

composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the

views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia

may be pursued by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen.

But so far from viewing the matter in the same light with those who

object to select corps as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and

were I to deliver my sentiments to a member of the federal legislature

from this State on the subject of a militia establishment, I should hold

to him, in substance, the following discourse:



"The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as

futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried

into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements is a

business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a

week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great

body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be

under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and

evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of

perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated

militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public

inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the

productive labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating upon

the present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of the whole

expense of the civil establishments of all the States. To attempt a

thing which would abridge the mass of labor and industry to so

considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the experiment, if made,

could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little more can

reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to

have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be

not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in

the course of a year.



"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be

abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the

utmost importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible,

be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. The attention of

the government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a

select corps of moderate extent, upon such principles as will really fit

them for service in case of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it

will be possible to have an excellent body of well-trained militia,

ready to take the field whenever the defense of the State shall require

it. This will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but

if circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an

army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to the liberties

of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at

all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready

to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens. This

appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a standing

army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist."



Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution

should I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety from

the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and

perdition. But how the national legislature may reason on the point, is

a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.



There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of

danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to

treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere

trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous

artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring

of political fanaticism. Where in the name of common-sense, are our

fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors,

our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men who are

daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who participate

with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests? What

reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the

Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to command its

services when necessary, while the particular States are to have the

SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS? If it were possible

seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable

establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the

officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to

extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will always

secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.



In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is

apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or romance,

which instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind

nothing but frightful and distorted shapes --



                "Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire";



discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming

everything it touches into a monster.



A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable

suggestions which have taken place respecting the power of calling for

the services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to

Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of

Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch

are to be paid in militiamen instead of louis d'ors and ducats. At one

moment there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the

people; at another moment the militia of Virginia are to be dragged from

their homes five or six hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy

of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be transported an

equal distance to subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic

Virginians. Do the persons who rave at this rate imagine that their art

or their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities upon the

people of America for infallible truths?



If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of despotism,

what need of the militia? If there should be no army, whither would the

militia, irritated by being called upon to undertake a distant and

hopeless expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of slavery

upon a part of their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of

the tyrants, who had meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a

project, to crush them in their imagined intrenchments of power, and to

make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed

people? Is this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a

numerous and enlightened nation? Do they begin by exciting the

detestation of the very instruments of their intended usurpations? Do

they usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful acts of

power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves

universal hatred and execration? Are suppositions of this sort the sober

admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning people? Or are they

the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts? If

we were even to suppose the national rulers actuated by the most

ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would

employ such preposterous means to accomplish their designs.



In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper

that the militia of a neighboring State should be marched into another,

to resist a common enemy, or to guard the republic against the violence

of faction or sedition. This was frequently the case, in respect to the

first object, in the course of the late war; and this mutual succor is,

indeed, a principal end of our political association. If the power of

affording it be placed under the direction of the Union, there will be

no danger of a supine and listless inattention to the dangers of a

neighbor, till its near approach had superadded the incitements of

self-preservation to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.



PUBLIUS