FEDERALIST No. 45



The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State

Governments Considered

For the Independent Journal.

Saturday, January 26, 1788



MADISON



To the People of the State of New York:



HAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal

government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be

considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the

portion of authority left in the several States.



The adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of considering in

the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the

purposes of the federal government, have exhausted themselves in a

secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree

of power to the governments of the particular States. But if the Union,

as has been shown, be essential to the security of the people of America

against foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against

contentions and wars among the different States; if it be essential to

guard them against those violent and oppressive factions which embitter

the blessings of liberty, and against those military establishments

which must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word, the Union

be essential to the happiness of the people of America, is it not

preposterous, to urge as an objection to a government, without which the

objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a government may

derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual

States? Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American

Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the

hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of

America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the government

of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments,

might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain

dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of the impious

doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for kings, not

kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in

another shape that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed

to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is too

early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good,

the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object

to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other

value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were

the plan of the convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice

would be, Reject the plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the

public happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far

as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness

of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former

be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is necessary, has

been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue will be endangered, is the

question before us.



Several important considerations have been touched in the course of

these papers, which discountenance the supposition that the operation of

the federal government will by degrees prove fatal to the State

governments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am

persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the

preponderancy of the last than of the first scale.



We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies,

the strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the members, to

despoil the general government of its authorities, with a very

ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the

encroachments. Although, in most of these examples, the system has been

so dissimilar from that under consideration as greatly to weaken any

inference concerning the latter from the fate of the former, yet, as the

States will retain, under the proposed Constitution, a very extensive

portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly

disregarded. In the Achaean league it is probable that the federal head

had a degree and species of power, which gave it a considerable likeness

to the government framed by the convention. The Lycian Confederacy, as

far as its principles and form are transmitted, must have borne a still

greater analogy to it. Yet history does not inform us that either of

them ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one consolidated

government. On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of them

proceeded from the incapacity of the federal authority to prevent the

dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities.

These cases are the more worthy of our attention, as the external causes

by which the component parts were pressed together were much more

numerous and powerful than in our case; and consequently less powerful

ligaments within would be sufficient to bind the members to the head,

and to each other.



In the feudal system, we have seen a similar propensity exemplified.

Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in every instance between

the local sovereigns and the people, and the sympathy in some instances

between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that

the local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments. Had

no external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination, and

particularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the

people, the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of as

many independent princes as there were formerly feudatory barons.



The State governments will have the advantage of the Federal government,

whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the

one on the other; to the weight of personal influence which each side

will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them; to the

predilection and probable support of the people; to the disposition and

faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other.



The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts

of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the

operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the

State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected

at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment,

and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate

will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures.

Even the House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the

people, will be chosen very much under the influence of that class of

men, whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election

into the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the

federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of

the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is

much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too

overbearing towards them. On the other side, the component parts of the

State governments will in no instance be indebted for their appointment

to the direct agency of the federal government, and very little, if at

all, to the local influence of its members.



The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the United

States will be much smaller than the number employed under the

particular States. There will consequently be less of personal influence

on the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the

legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more

States, the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers

of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town officers, for

three millions and more of people, intermixed, and having particular

acquaintance with every class and circle of people, must exceed, beyond

all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description

who will be employed in the administration of the federal system.

Compare the members of the three great departments of the thirteen

States, excluding from the judiciary department the justices of peace,

with the members of the corresponding departments of the single

government of the Union; compare the militia officers of three millions

of people with the military and marine officers of any establishment

which is within the compass of probability, or, I may add, of

possibility, and in this view alone, we may pronounce the advantage of

the States to be decisive. If the federal government is to have

collectors of revenue, the State governments will have theirs also. And

as those of the former will be principally on the seacoast, and not very

numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over the face of the

country, and will be very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies

on the same side. It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and

may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes

throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not be

resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue; that an option

will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous

collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the

immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the

officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States.

Indeed it is extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly

in the organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States

will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union. Should it

happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue should be

appointed under the federal government, the influence of the whole

number would not bear a comparison with that of the multitude of State

officers in the opposite scale. Within every district to which a federal

collector would be allotted, there would not be less than thirty or

forty, or even more, officers of different descriptions, and many of

them persons of character and weight, whose influence would lie on the

side of the State.



The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal

government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State

governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised

principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign

commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part,

be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to

all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the

lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order,

improvement, and prosperity of the State.



The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and

important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments, in

times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably bear a

small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy

another advantage over the federal government. The more adequate,

indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the national defense, the

less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their

ascendancy over the governments of the particular States.



If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be

found that the change which it proposes consists much less in the

addition of NEW POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration of its

ORIGINAL POWERS. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power;

but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no

apprehensions are entertained. The powers relating to war and peace,

armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other more

considerable powers, are all vested in the existing Congress by the

articles of Confederation. The proposed change does not enlarge these

powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them.

The change relating to taxation may be regarded as the most important;

and yet the present Congress have as complete authority to REQUIRE of

the States indefinite supplies of money for the common defense and

general welfare, as the future Congress will have to require them of

individual citizens; and the latter will be no more bound than the

States themselves have been, to pay the quotas respectively taxed on

them. Had the States complied punctually with the articles of

Confederation, or could their compliance have been enforced by as

peaceable means as may be used with success towards single persons, our

past experience is very far from countenancing an opinion, that the

State governments would have lost their constitutional powers, and have

gradually undergone an entire consolidation. To maintain that such an

event would have ensued, would be to say at once, that the existence of

the State governments is incompatible with any system whatever that

accomplishes the essental purposes of the Union.



PUBLIUS