FEDERALIST No. 52



The House of Representatives

From the New York Packet.

Friday, February 8, 1788. 



MADISON



To the People of the State of New York:



FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass

on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the

government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives.



The first view to be taken of this part of the government relates to the

qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are

to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of

the State legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is very

justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It

was incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish this

right in the Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional

regulation of the Congress, would have been improper for the reason just

mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the

States, would have been improper for the same reason; and for the

additional reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the State

governments that branch of the federal government which ought to be

dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the different

qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule, would

probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would

have been difficult to the convention. The provision made by the

convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their

option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is

conformable to the standard already established, or which may be

established, by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States,

because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is not alterable by

the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the

States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as

to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution.



The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly

defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more

susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and

regulated by the convention. A representative of the United States must

be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen

of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be an

inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his

service, must be in no office under the United States. Under these

reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government

is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive,

whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any

particular profession of religious faith.



The term for which the representatives are to be elected falls under a

second view which may be taken of this branch. In order to decide on the

propriety of this article, two questions must be considered: first,

whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe; secondly,

whether they be necessary or useful.



First. As it is essential to liberty that the government in general

should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly

essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an

immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.

Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this

dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. But what particular

degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose, does

not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must depend

on a variety of circumstances with which it may be connected. Let us

consult experience, the guide that ought always to be followed whenever

it can be found.



The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the

citizens in person, being at most but very imperfectly known to ancient

polity, it is in more modern times only that we are to expect

instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a research too

vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine ourselves to the few

examples which are best known, and which bear the greatest analogy to

our particular case. The first to which this character ought to be

applied, is the House of Commons in Great Britain. The history of this

branch of the English Constitution, anterior to the date of Magna

Charta, is too obscure to yield instruction. The very existence of it

has been made a question among political antiquaries. The earliest

records of subsequent date prove that parliaments were to SIT only every

year; not that they were to be ELECTED every year. And even these annual

sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch, that, under

various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions were often

contrived by royal ambition. To remedy this grievance, it was provided

by a statute in the reign of Charles II, that the intermissions should

not be protracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession of

William III, when a revolution took place in the government, the

subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be

among the fundamental rights of the people that parliaments ought to be

held FREQUENTLY. By another statute, which passed a few years later in

the same reign, the term "frequently," which had alluded to the

triennial period settled in the time of Charles II, is reduced to a

precise meaning, it being expressly enacted that a new parliament shall

be called within three years after the termination of the former. The

last change, from three to seven years, is well known to have been

introduced pretty early in the present century, under on alarm for the

Hanoverian succession. From these facts it appears that the greatest

frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom,

for binding the representatives to their constituents, does not exceed a

triennial return of them. And if we may argue from the degree of liberty

retained even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious

ingredients in the parliamentary constitution, we cannot doubt that a

reduction of the period from seven to three years, with the other

necessary reforms, would so far extend the influence of the people over

their representatives as to satisfy us that biennial elections, under

the federal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite

dependence of the House of Representatives on their constituents.



Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated entirely by the

discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on the

accession of a new prince, or some other contingent event. The

parliament which commenced with George II. was continued throughout his

whole reign, a period of about thirty-five years. The only dependence of

the representatives on the people consisted in the right of the latter

to supply occasional vacancies by the election of new members, and in

the chance of some event which might produce a general new election. The

ability also of the Irish parliament to maintain the rights of their

constituents, so far as the disposition might exist, was extremely

shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects of their

deliberation. Of late these shackles, if I mistake not, have been

broken; and octennial parliaments have besides been established. What

effect may be produced by this partial reform, must be left to further

experience. The example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but

little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from

it, it must be that if the people of that country have been able under

all these disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of

biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty, which

might depend on a due connection between their representatives and

themselves.



Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The example of these States,

when British colonies, claims particular attention, at the same time

that it is so well known as to require little to be said on it. The

principle of representation, in one branch of the legislature at least,

was established in all of them. But the periods of election were

different. They varied from one to seven years. Have we any reason to

infer, from the spirit and conduct of the representatives of the people,

prior to the Revolution, that biennial elections would have been

dangerous to the public liberties? The spirit which everywhere displayed

itself at the commencement of the struggle, and which vanquished the

obstacles to independence, is the best of proofs that a sufficient

portion of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed to inspire both a sense

of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement This remark holds

good, as well with regard to the then colonies whose elections were

least frequent, as to those whose elections were most frequent Virginia

was the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary

usurpations of Great Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by

public act, the resolution of independence. In Virginia, nevertheless,

if I have not been misinformed, elections under the former government

were septennial. This particular example is brought into view, not as a

proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was

probably accidental; and still less of any advantage in SEPTENNIAL

elections, for when compared with a greater frequency they are

inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be a very

substantial proof, that the liberties of the people can be in no danger

from BIENNIAL elections.



The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little

strengthened by recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that the

federal legislature will possess a part only of that supreme legislative

authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament; and

which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the colonial assemblies

and the Irish legislature. It is a received and well-founded maxim, that

where no other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is,

the shorter ought to be its duration; and, conversely, the smaller the

power, the more safely may its duration be protracted. In the second

place, it has, on another occasion, been shown that the federal

legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on its people,

as other legislative bodies are, but that it will be, moreover, watched

and controlled by the several collateral legislatures, which other

legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no comparison can be

made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent

branches of the federal government for seducing, if they should be

disposed to seduce, the House of Representatives from their duty to the

people, and the means of influence over the popular branch possessed by

the other branches of the government above cited. With less power,

therefore, to abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted on

one side, and will be doubly watched on the other.



PUBLIUS