FEDERALIST No. 53



The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)

For the Independent Journal. 

Saturday, February 9, 1788. 



MADISON



To the People of the State of New York:



I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, "that where

annual elections end, tyranny begins." If it be true, as has often been

remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in

reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often

applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not

look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which

this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to

the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists between

the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can

bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in

this respect, confined to any single point of time; but lies within

extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which

may be required by the various situations and circumstances of civil

society. The election of magistrates might be, if it were found

expedient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or

monthly, as well as annual; and if circumstances may require a deviation

from the rule on one side, why not also on the other side? Turning our

attention to the periods established among ourselves, for the election

of the most numerous branches of the State legislatures, we find them by

no means coinciding any more in this instance, than in the elections of

other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods

are half-yearly. In the other States, South Carolina excepted, they are

annual. In South Carolina they are biennial -- as is proposed in the

federal government. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the

longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to show, that

Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater

share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that either the one

or the other of these States is distinguished in these respects, and by

these causes, from the States whose elections are different from both.



In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one,

and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important distinction

so well understood in America, between a Constitution established by the

people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the

government and alterable by the government, seems to have been little

understood and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme

power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a

full power to change the form of the government. Even in Great Britain,

where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most

discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it

is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and

uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary

objects of legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several

instances, actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the most

fundamental articles of the government. They have in particular, on

several occasions, changed the period of election; and, on the last

occasion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial

elections, but by the same act, continued themselves in place four years

beyond the term for which they were elected by the people. An attention

to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the

votaries of free government, of which frequency of elections is the

corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty,

against the danger to which it is exposed. Where no Constitution,

paramount to the government, either existed or could be obtained, no

constitutional security, similar to that established in the United

States, was to be attempted. Some other security, therefore, was to be

sought for; and what better security would the case admit, than that of

selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time, as

a standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing the

national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exertions? The most

simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to the subject was that

of a year; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable

zeal, to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an

unlimited government, that the advance towards tyranny was to be

calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of annual

elections. But what necessity can there be of applying this expedient to

a government limited, as the federal government will be, by the

authority of a paramount Constitution? Or who will pretend that the

liberties of the people of America will not be more secure under

biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those

of any other nation would be, where elections were annual, or even more

frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the

government?



The second question stated is, whether biennial elections be necessary

or useful. The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative

will appear from several very obvious considerations.



No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright

intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the

subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be

acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of men in

private as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained,

or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station

which requires the use of it. The period of service, ought, therefore,

in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical

knowledge requisite to the due performance of the service. The period of

legislative service established in most of the States for the more

numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be

put into this simple form: does the period of two years bear no greater

proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal legislation than one

year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation? The very

statement of the question, in this form, suggests the answer that ought

to be given to it.



In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing laws

which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all the citizens

are more or less conversant; and to the general affairs of the State,

which lie within a small compass, are not very diversified, and occupy

much of the attention and conversation of every class of people. The

great theatre of the United States presents a very different scene. The

laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in every State;

whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very

extensive region, and are extremely diversified by the local affairs

connected with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any

other place than in the central councils to which a knowledge of them

will be brought by the representatives of every part of the empire. Yet

some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws, of all the States,

ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States. How can

foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws, without some

acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the

regulatious of the different States? How can the trade between the

different States be duly regulated, without some knowledge of their

relative situations in these and other respects? How can taxes be

judiciously imposed and effectually collected, if they be not

accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to

these objects in the different States? How can uniform regulations for

the militia be duly provided, without a similar knowledge of many

internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each

other? These are the principal objects of federal legislation, and

suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the

representatives ought to acquire. The other interior objects will

require a proportional degree of information with regard to them.



It is true that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much

diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of

the government and the primeval formation of a federal code.

Improvements on the first draughts will every year become both easier

and fewer. Past transactions of the government will be a ready and

accurate source of information to new members. The affairs of the Union

will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among

the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse among those of

different States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual

knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general

assimilation of their manners and laws. But with all these abatements,

the business of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both

in novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State,

as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are to

transact it.



A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal

representative, and which has not been mentioned is that of foreign

affairs. In regulating our own commerce he ought to be not only

acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other

nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations.

He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law of nations; for that,

as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation, is submitted

to the federal government. And although the House of Representatives is

not immediately to participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements,

yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public

affairs, those particular branches will frequently deserve attention in

the ordinary course of legislation, and will sometimes demand particular

legislative sanction and co-operation. Some portion of this knowledge

may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can

only be derived from the public sources of information; and all of it

will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the subject

during the period of actual service in the legislature.



There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but which

are not unworthy of notice. The distance which many of the

representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered

necessary by that circumstance, might be much more serious objections

with fit men to this service, if limited to a single year, than if

extended to two years. No argument can be drawn on this subject, from

the case of the delegates to the existing Congress. They are elected

annually, it is true; but their re-election is considered by the

legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. The election of the

representatives by the people would not be governed by the same

principle.



A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess

superior talents; will, by frequent reelections, become members of long

standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps

not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. The greater the

proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of

the members the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may

be laid for them. This remark is no less applicable to the relation

which will subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate.



It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent

elections even in single States, where they are large, and hold but one

legislative session in a year, that spurious elections cannot be

investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due

effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means,

the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of holding

it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious

encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining

irregular returns. Were elections for the federal legislature to be

annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in

the more distant States. Each house is, as it necessarily must be, the

judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members; and

whatever improvements may be suggested by experience, for simplifying

and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a portion of a

year would unavoidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be

dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would be

little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat.



All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming, that

biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we

have seen that they will be safe to the liberty of the people.



PUBLIUS