FEDERALIST No. 54



The Apportionment of Members Among the States

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, February 12, 1788. 



MADISON



To the People of the State of New York:



THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates

to the appointment of its members to the several States which is to be

determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes.



It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to

be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to

represent the people of each State. The establishment of the same rule

for the appointment of taxes, will probably be as little contested;

though the rule itself in this case, is by no means founded on the same

principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the

personal rights of the people, with which it has a natural and universal

connection. In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth,

of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a

very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as

applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is

evidently the least objectionable among the practicable rules, and had

too recently obtained the general sanction of America, not to have found

a ready preference with the convention.



All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said; but does it follow, from

an admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves

combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to

be included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are

considered as property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be

comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and

to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of

persons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full

force. I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning which may be

offered on the opposite side.



"We subscribe to the doctrine," might one of our Southern brethren

observe, "that representation relates more immediately to persons, and

taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of

this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the fact,

that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect

whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake of

both these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as

persons, and in other respects as property. In being compelled to labor,

not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one master to

another master; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in

his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of

another -- the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and

classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal

denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in his

life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the

master of his labor and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for

all violence committed against others -- the slave is no less evidently

regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of the

irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of

property. The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great

propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed

character of persons and of property. This is in fact their true

character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which

they live; and it will not be denied, that these are the proper

criterion; because it is only under the pretext that the laws have

transformed the negroes into subjects of property, that a place is

disputed them in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted, that if

the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the

negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with

the other inhabitants.



"This question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all sides,

that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as they are the

only proper scale of representation. Would the convention have been

impartial or consistent, if they had rejected the slaves from the list

of inhabitants, when the shares of representation were to be calculated,

and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was to

be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected, that the Southern States

would concur in a system, which considered their slaves in some degree

as men, when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in

the same light, when advantages were to be conferred? Might not some

surprise also be expressed, that those who reproach the Southern States

with the barbarous policy of considering as property a part of their

human brethren, should themselves contend, that the government to which

all the States are to be parties, ought to consider this unfortunate

race more completely in the unnatural light of property, than the very

laws of which they complain?



"It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not included in the estimate

of representatives in any of the States possessing them. They neither

vote themselves nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon what

principle, then, ought they to be taken into the federal estimate of

representation? In rejecting them altogether, the Constitution would, in

this respect, have followed the very laws which have been appealed to as

the proper guide.



"This objection is repelled by a single abservation. It is a fundamental

principle of the proposed Constitution, that as the aggregate number of

representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a

federal rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the

right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be exercised

by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself may designate. The

qualifications on which the right of suffrage depend are not, perhaps,

the same in any two States. In some of the States the difference is very

material. In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are

deprived of this right by the constitution of the State, who will be

included in the census by which the federal Constitution apportions the

representatives. In this point of view the Southern States might retort

the complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down by the

convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of

particular States towards their own inhabitants; and consequently, that

the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the census

according to their full number, in like manner with other inhabitants,

who, by the policy of other States, are not admitted to all the rights

of citizens. A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is waived

by those who would be gainers by it. All that they ask is that equal

moderation be shown on the other side. Let the case of the slaves be

considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the compromising

expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as

inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free

inhabitants, which regards the SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the

MAN.



"After all, may not another ground be taken on which this article of the

Constitution will admit of a still more ready defense? We have hitherto

proceeded on the idea that representation related to persons only, and

not at all to property. But is it a just idea? Government is instituted

no less for protection of the property, than of the persons, of

individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered

as represented by those who are charged with the government. Upon this

principle it is, that in several of the States, and particularly in the

State of New York, one branch of the government is intended more

especially to be the guardian of property, and is accordingly elected by

that part of the society which is most interested in this object of

government. In the federal Constitution, this policy does not prevail.

The rights of property are committed into the same hands with the

personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore, to be paid to property

in the choice of those hands.



"For another reason, the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the

people of each State, ought to bear some proportion to the comparative

wealth of the States. States have not, like individuals, an influence

over each other, arising from superior advantages of fortune. If the law

allows an opulent citizen but a single vote in the choice of his

representative, the respect and consequence which he derives from his

fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes of others to the

objects of his choice; and through this imperceptible channel the rights

of property are conveyed into the public representation. A State

possesses no such influence over other States. It is not probable that

the richest State in the Confederacy will ever influence the choice of a

single representative in any other State. Nor will the representatives

of the larger and richer States possess any other advantage in the

federal legislature, over the representatives of other States, than what

may result from their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their

superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it

ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation. The

new Constitution is, in this respect, materially different from the

existing Confederation, as well as from that of the United Netherlands,

and other similar confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of

the federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary

resolutions of the states composing the union. Hence the states, though

possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an unequal

influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent

and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed Constitution, the federal

acts will take effect without the necessary intervention of the

individual States. They will depend merely on the majority of votes in

the federal legislature, and consequently each vote, whether proceeding

from a larger or smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or

powerful, will have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner as

the votes individually given in a State legislature, by the

representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have each a

precise equality of value and effect; or if there be any difference in

the case, it proceeds from the difference in the personal character of

the individual representative, rather than from any regard to the extent

of the district from which he comes."



Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern interests might

employ on this subject; and although it may appear to be a little

strained in some points, yet, on the whole, I must confess that it fully

reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention have

established.



In one respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation

and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the

census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in a

considerable degree on the disposition, if not on the co-operation, of

the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel as

little bias as possible, to swell or to reduce the amount of their

numbers. Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this

rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants.

Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary

temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the

States will have opposite interests, which will control and balance each

other, and produce the requisite impartiality.



PUBLIUS