FEDERALIST No. 55



The Total Number of the House of Representatives

For the Independent Journal. 

Wednesday, February 13, 1788. 



MADISON



To the People of the State of New York:



THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms

another and a very interesting point of view, under which this branch of

the federal legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any article, indeed,

in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention,

by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument with which

it has been assailed. The charges exhibited against it are, first, that

so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the

public interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper

knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents;

thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citizens which will

sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the people, and be

most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few on the depression

of the many; fourthly, that defective as the number will be in the first

instance, it will be more and more disproportionate, by the increase of

the people, and the obstacles which will prevent a correspondent

increase of the representatives.



In general it may be remarked on this subject, that no political problem

is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the

number most convenient for a representative legislature; nor is there

any point on which the policy of the several States is more at variance,

whether we compare their legislative assemblies directly with each

other, or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the

number of their constituents. Passing over the difference between the

smallest and largest States, as Delaware, whose most numerous branch

consists of twenty-one representatives, and Massachusetts, where it

amounts to between three and four hundred, a very considerable

difference is observable among States nearly equal in population. The

number of representatives in Pennsylvania is not more than one fifth of

that in the State last mentioned. New York, whose population is to that

of South Carolina as six to five, has little more than one third of the

number of representatives. As great a disparity prevails between the

States of Georgia and Delaware or Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, the

representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents

than of one for every four or five thousand. In Rhode Island, they bear

a proportion of at least one for every thousand. And according to the

constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one to every

ten electors; and must unavoidably far exceed the proportion in any of

the other States.



Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio between the

representatives and the people ought not to be the same where the latter

are very numerous as where they are very few. Were the representatives

in Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode Island, they would,

at this time, amount to between four and five hundred; and twenty or

thirty years hence, to a thousand. On the other hand, the ratio of

Pennsylvania, if applied to the State of Delaware, would reduce the

representative assembly of the latter to seven or eight members. Nothing

can be more fallacious than to found our political calculations on

arithmetical principles. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly

trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does not

follow that six or seven hundred would be proportionably a better

depositary. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand,

the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is, that in all

cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the

benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too

easy a combination for improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the

number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to

avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude. In all very

numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails

to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a

Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.



It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were

applied to the case of biennial elections. For the same reason that the

limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State

legislatures, justify less frequent elections than the public safely

might otherwise require, the members of the Congress need be less

numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation, and were

under no other than the ordinary restraints of other legislative bodies.



With these general ideas in our mind, let us weigh the objections which

have been stated against the number of members proposed for the House of

Representatives. It is said, in the first place, that so small a number

cannot be safely trusted with so much power.



The number of which this branch of the legislature is to consist, at the

outset of the government, will be sixtyfive. Within three years a census

is to be taken, when the number may be augmented to one for every thirty

thousand inhabitants; and within every successive period of ten years

the census is to be renewed, and augmentations may continue to be made

under the above limitation. It will not be thought an extravagant

conjecture that the first census will, at the rate of one for every

thirty thousand, raise the number of representatives to at least one

hundred. Estimating the negroes in the proportion of three fifths, it

can scarcely be doubted that the population of the United States will by

that time, if it does not already, amount to three millions. At the

expiration of twenty-five years, according to the computed rate of

increase, the number of representatives will amount to two hundred, and

of fifty years, to four hundred. This is a number which, I presume, will

put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the body. I take

for granted here what I shall, in answering the fourth objection,

hereafter show, that the number of representatives will be augmented

from time to time in the manner provided by the Constitution. On a

contrary supposition, I should admit the objection to have very great

weight indeed.



The true question to be decided then is, whether the smallness of the

number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty?

Whether sixty-five members for a few years, and a hundred or two hundred

for a few more, be a safe depositary for a limited and well-guarded

power of legislating for the United States? I must own that I could not

give a negative answer to this question, without first obliterating

every impression which I have received with regard to the present genius

of the people of America, the spirit which actuates the State

legislatures, and the principles which are incorporated with the

political character of every class of citizens I am unable to conceive

that the people of America, in their present temper, or under any

circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and every second

year repeat the choice of, sixty-five or a hundred men who would be

disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. I am

unable to conceive that the State legislatures, which must feel so many

motives to watch, and which possess so many means of counteracting, the

federal legislature, would fail either to detect or to defeat a

conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of their common

constituents. I am equally unable to conceive that there are at this

time, or can be in any short time, in the United States, any sixty-five

or a hundred men capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the

people at large, who would either desire or dare, within the short space

of two years, to betray the solemn trust committed to them. What change

of circumstances, time, and a fuller population of our country may

produce, requires a prophetic spirit to declare, which makes no part of

my pretensions. But judging from the circumstances now before us, and

from the probable state of them within a moderate period of time, I must

pronounce that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number

of hands proposed by the federal Constitution.



From what quarter can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign gold?

If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and enable

them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it happened that

we are at this time a free and independent nation? The Congress which

conducted us through the Revolution was a less numerous body than their

successors will be; they were not chosen by, nor responsible to, their

fellowcitizens at large; though appointed from year to year, and

recallable at pleasure, they were generally continued for three years,

and prior to the ratification of the federal articles, for a still

longer term. They held their consultations always under the veil of

secrecy; they had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign

nations; through the whole course of the war they had the fate of their

country more in their hands than it is to be hoped will ever be the case

with our future representatives; and from the greatness of the prize at

stake, and the eagerness of the party which lost it, it may well be

supposed that the use of other means than force would not have been

scrupled. Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not

betrayed; nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular

ever suffered, even from the whispers of calumny.



Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the federal

government? But where are the means to be found by the President, or the

Senate, or both? Their emoluments of office, it is to be presumed, will

not, and without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives

cannot, more than suffice for very different purposes; their private

fortunes, as they must allbe American citizens, cannot possibly be

sources of danger. The only means, then, which they can possess, will be

in the dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests her

charge? Sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption is to be

exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate. Now,

the fidelity of the other House is to be the victim. The improbability

of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of

government, standing on as different foundations as republican

principles will well admit, and at the same time accountable to the

society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet this

apprehension. But, fortunately, the Constitution has provided a still

further safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible

to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may

be increased, during the term of their election. No offices therefore

can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become vacant

by ordinary casualties: and to suppose that these would be sufficient to

purchase the guardians of the people, selected by the people themselves,

is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and to

substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all

reasoning must be vain. The sincere friends of liberty, who give

themselves up to the extravagancies of this passion, are not aware of

the injury they do their own cause. As there is a degree of depravity in

mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust,

so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain

portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the

existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.

Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of

some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference

would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for

self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can

restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.



PUBLIUS