FEDERALIST No. 58



Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the

Progress of Population Demands Considered

For the Independent Journal

Wednesday, February 20, 1788



MADISON



To the People of the State of New York:



THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to

examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will

not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may

demand.



It has been admitted, that this objection, if well supported, would have

great weight. The following observations will show that, like most other

objections against the Constitution, it can only proceed from a partial

view of the subject, or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures

every object which is beheld.



1. Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that the

federal Constitution will not suffer by a comparison with the State

constitutions, in the security provided for a gradual augmentation of

the number of representatives. The number which is to prevail in the

first instance is declared to be temporary. Its duration is limited to

the short term of three years.



Within every successive term of ten years a census of inhabitants is to

be repeated. The unequivocal objects of these regulations are, first, to

readjust, from time to time, the apportionment of representatives to the

number of inhabitants, under the single exception that each State shall

have one representative at least; secondly, to augment the number of

representatives at the same periods, under the sole limitation that the

whole number shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants.

If we review the constitutions of the several States, we shall find that

some of them contain no determinate regulations on this subject, that

others correspond pretty much on this point with the federal

Constitution, and that the most effectual security in any of them is

resolvable into a mere directory provision.



2. As far as experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual

increase of representatives under the State constitutions has at least

kept pace with that of the constituents, and it appears that the former

have been as ready to concur in such measures as the latter have been to

call for them.



3. There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution which insures a

watchful attention in a majority both of the people and of their

representatives to a constitutional augmentation of the latter. The

peculiarity lies in this, that one branch of the legislature is a

representation of citizens, the other of the States: in the former,

consequently, the larger States will have most weight; in the latter,

the advantage will be in favor of the smaller States. From this

circumstance it may with certainty be inferred that the larger States

will be strenuous advocates for increasing the number and weight of that

part of the legislature in which their influence predominates. And it so

happens that four only of the largest will have a majority of the whole

votes in the House of Representatives. Should the representatives or

people, therefore, of the smaller States oppose at any time a reasonable

addition of members, a coalition of a very few States will be sufficient

to overrule the opposition; a coalition which, notwithstanding the

rivalship and local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary

occasions, would not fail to take place, when not merely prompted by

common interest, but justified by equity and the principles of the

Constitution.



It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would be prompted by like

motives to an adverse coalition; and as their concurrence would be

indispensable, the just and constitutional views of the other branch

might be defeated. This is the difficulty which has probably created the

most serious apprehensions in the jealous friends of a numerous

representation. Fortunately it is among the difficulties which, existing

only in appearance, vanish on a close and accurate inspection. The

following reflections will, if I mistake not, be admitted to be

conclusive and satisfactory on this point.



Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two

houses on all legislative subjects, except the originating of money

bills, it cannot be doubted that the House, composed of the greater

number of members, when supported by the more powerful States, and

speaking the known and determined sense of a majority of the people,

will have no small advantage in a question depending on the comparative

firmness of the two houses.



This advantage must be increased by the consciousness, felt by the same

side of being supported in its demands by right, by reason, and by the

Constitution; and the consciousness, on the opposite side, of contending

against the force of all these solemn considerations.



It is farther to be considered, that in the gradation between the

smallest and largest States, there are several, which, though most

likely in general to arrange themselves among the former are too little

removed in extent and population from the latter, to second an

opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence it is by no

means certain that a majority of votes, even in the Senate, would be

unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number of representatives.



It will not be looking too far to add, that the senators from all the

new States may be gained over to the just views of the House of

Representatives, by an expedient too obvious to be overlooked. As these

States will, for a great length of time, advance in population with

peculiar rapidity, they will be interested in frequent reapportionments

of the representatives to the number of inhabitants. The large States,

therefore, who will prevail in the House of Representatives, will have

nothing to do but to make reapportionments and augmentations mutually

conditions of each other; and the senators from all the most growing

States will be bound to contend for the latter, by the interest which

their States will feel in the former.



These considerations seem to afford ample security on this subject, and

ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been indulged

with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should all be

insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States, or their

predominant influence in the councils of the Senate, a constitutional

and infallible resource still remains with the larger States, by which

they will be able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The

House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose,

the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word,

hold the purse -- that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the

history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation

of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and

importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all

the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This

power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and

effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate

representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every

grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.



But will not the House of Representatives be as much interested as the

Senate in maintaining the government in its proper functions, and will

they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation

on the pliancy of the Senate? Or, if such a trial of firmness between

the two branches were hazarded, would not the one be as likely first to

yield as the other? These questions will create no difficulty with those

who reflect that in all cases the smaller the number, and the more

permanent and conspicuous the station, of men in power, the stronger

must be the interest which they will individually feel in whatever

concerns the government. Those who represent the dignity of their

country in the eyes of other nations, will be particularly sensible to

every prospect of public danger, or of dishonorable stagnation in public

affairs. To those causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the

British House of Commons over the other branches of the government,

whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed. An absolute

inflexibility on the side of the latter, although it could not have

failed to involve every department of the state in the general

confusion, has neither been apprehended nor experienced. The utmost

degree of firmness that can be displayed by the federal Senate or

President, will not be more than equal to a resistance in which they

will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles.



In this review of the Constitution of the House of Representatives, I

have passed over the circumstances of economy, which, in the present

state of affairs, might have had some effect in lessening the temporary

number of representatives, and a disregard of which would probably have

been as rich a theme of declamation against the Constitution as has been

shown by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any remarks

on the difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances, in

engaging in the federal service a large number of such characters as the

people will probably elect. One observation, however, I must be

permitted to add on this subject as claiming, in my judgment, a very

serious attention. It is, that in all legislative assemblies the greater

the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will in

fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more numerous an

assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the greater is known

to be the ascendency of passion over reason. In the next place, the

larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of

limited information and of weak capacities. Now, it is precisely on

characters of this description that the eloquence and address of the few

are known to act with all their force. In the ancient republics, where

the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single orator, or an

artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as

if a sceptre had been placed in his single hand. On the same principle,

the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered, the

more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings

of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the

slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than

in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain

limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few.

Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, AFTER

SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR THE PURPOSES OF SAFETY, OF LOCAL

INFORMATION, AND OF DIFFUSIVE SYMPATHY WITH THE WHOLE SOCIETY, they will

counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives.

The countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the

soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be

enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs

by which its motions are directed.



As connected with the objection against the number of representatives,

may properly be here noticed, that which has been suggested against the

number made competent for legislative business. It has been said that

more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum; and in

particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a

decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a

precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional shield to

some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and

partial measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the

inconveniences in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the

general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to

be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be

reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power

would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege

limited to particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage

of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general

weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable indulgences.

Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of

secessions; a practice which has shown itself even in States where a

majority only is required; a practice subversive of all the principles

of order and regular government; a practice which leads more directly to

public convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than any other

which has yet been displayed among us.



PUBLIUS