FEDERALIST No. 60



The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)

From the Independent Journal.

Saturday, February 23, 1788.



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:



WE HAVE seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the

federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State

legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other

side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own

elections to the Union itself. It is not pretended, that this right

would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the

representation. The interest of all would, in this respect at least, be

the security of all. But it is alleged, that it might be employed in

such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men

in exclusion of others, by confining the places of election to

particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at

large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions, this

seems to be the most chimerical. On the one hand, no rational

calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the

disposition which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply,

could ever find its way into the national councils; and on the other, it

may be concluded with certainty, that if so improper a spirit should

ever gain admittance into them, it would display itself in a form

altogether different and far more decisive.



The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from

this single reflection, that it could never be made without causing an

immediate revolt of the great body of the people, headed and directed by

the State governments. It is not difficult to conceive that this

characteristic right of freedom may, in certain turbulent and factious

seasons, be violated, in respect to a particular class of citizens, by a

victorious and overbearing majority; but that so fundamental a

privilege, in a country so situated and enlightened, should be invaded

to the prejudice of the great mass of the people, by the deliberate

policy of the government, without occasioning a popular revolution, is

altogether inconceivable and incredible.



In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations of a

more precise nature, which forbid all apprehension on the subject. The

dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose the national

government, and Őstill more in the manner in which they will be brought

into action in its various branches, must form a powerful obstacle to a

concert of views in any partial scheme of elections. There is sufficient

diversity in the state of property, in the genius, manners, and habits

of the people of the different parts of the Union, to occasion a

material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the

different ranks and conditions in society. And though an intimate

intercourse under the same government will promote a gradual

assimilation in some of these respects, yet there are causes, as well

physical as moral, which may, in a greater or less degree, permanently

nourish different propensities and inclinations in this respect. But the

circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the

matter, will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several

component parts of the government. The House of Representatives being to

be elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State

legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the

people, there would be little probability of a common interest to cement

these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of

electors.



As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of "time and

manner," which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the national

government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit which will

direct the choice of its members. The collective sense of the State

legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of that

sort; a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the

discrimination apprehended would never be attempted. For what inducement

could the Senate have to concur in a preference in which itself would

not be included? Or to what purpose would it be established, in

reference to one branch of the legislature, if it could not be extended

to the other? The composition of the one would in this case counteract

that of the other. And we can never suppose that it would embrace the

appointments to the Senate, unless we can at the same time suppose the

voluntary co-operation of the State legislatures. If we make the latter

supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the power in question is

placed -- whether in their hands or in those of the Union.



But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the

national councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the

different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of

property, or between the different degrees of property? Will it lean in

favor of the landed interest, or the moneyed interest, or the mercantile

interest, or the manufacturing interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable

language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the

elevation of "the wealthy and the well-born," to the exclusion and

debasement of all the rest of the society?



If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned

in any particular description of industry or property, I presume it will

readily be admitted, that the competition for it will lie between landed

men and merchants. And I scruple not to affirm, that it is infinitely

less likely that either of them should gain an ascendant in the national

councils, than that the one or the other of them should predominate in

all the local councils. The inference will be, that a conduct tending to

give an undue preference to either is much less to be dreaded from the

former than from the latter.



The several States are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and

commerce. In most, if not all of them, agriculture is predominant. In a

few of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire, and in most of

them has a considerable share of influence. In proportion as either

prevails, it will be conveyed into the national representation; and for

the very reason, that this will be an emanation from a greater variety

of interests, and in much more various proportions, than are to be found

in any single State, it will be much less apt to espouse either of them

with a decided partiality, than the representation of any single State.



In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, where the

rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed interest must, upon

the whole, preponderate in the government. As long as this interest

prevails in most of the State legislatures, so long it must maintain a

correspondent superiority in the national Senate, which will generally

be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies. It cannot

therefore be presumed, that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile

class will ever be a favorite object of this branch of the federal

legislature. In applying thus particularly to the Senate a general

observation suggested by the situation of the country, I am governed by

the consideration, that the credulous votaries of State power cannot,

upon their own principles, suspect, that the State legislatures would be

warped from their duty by any external influence. But in reality the

same situation must have the same effect, in the primative composition

at least of the federal House of Representatives: an improper bias

towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this

quarter as from the other.



In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it

may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in the national

government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the

federal administration to the landed class? As there is little

likelihood that the supposition of such a bias will have any terrors for

those who would be immediately injured by it, a labored answer to this

question will be dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark, first,

that for the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is less likely that any

decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the Union than in

those of any of its members. Secondly, that there would be no temptation

to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class, because that

class would, in the natural course of things, enjoy as great a

preponderancy as itself could desire. And thirdly, that men accustomed

to investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale, must

be too well convinced of the utility of commerce, to be inclined to

inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result from the entire

exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a share

in the management of them. The importance of commerce, in the view of

revenue alone, must effectually guard it against the enmity of a body

which would be continually importuned in its favor, by the urgent calls

of public necessity.



I the rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a

preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of

industry and property, because, as far as I understand the meaning of

the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind. They

appear to have in view, as the objects of the preference with which they

endeavor to alarm us, those whom they designate by the description of

"the wealthy and the well-born." These, it seems, are to be exalted to

an odious pre-eminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens. At one

time, however, their elevation is to be a necessary consequence of the

smallness of the representative body; at another time it is to be

effected by depriving the people at large of the opportunity of

exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of that body.



But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election

to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference?

Are "the wealthy and the well-born," as they are called, confined to

particular spots in the several States? Have they, by some miraculous

instinct or foresight, set apart in each of them a common place of

residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Or are

they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country as avarice

or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their

predecessors? If the latter is the case, (as every intelligent man knows

it to be,[1]) is it not evident that the policy of confining the places

of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its own

aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth is,

that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference

apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either for

those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power

to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority would be

expressly restricted to the regulation of the TIMES, the PLACES, the

MANNER of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or

be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and

fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature.



Let it, however, be admitted, for argument sake, that the expedient

suggested might be successful; and let it at the same time be equally

taken for granted that all the scruples which a sense of duty or an

apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire, were

overcome in the breasts of the national rulers, still I imagine it will

hardly be pretended that they could ever hope to carry such an

enterprise into execution without the aid of a military force sufficient

to subdue the resistance of the great body of the people. The

improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object has been

discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers; but that

the futility of the objection under consideration may appear in the

strongest light, it shall be conceded for a moment that such a force

might exist, and the national government shall be supposed to be in the

actual possession of it. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition

to invade the essential rights of the community, and with the means of

gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who were

actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of

fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite class

of men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to

their own immediate aggrandizement? Would they not rather boldly resolve

to perpetuate themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation,

than to trust to precarious expedients which, in spite of all the

precautions that might accompany them, might terminate in the

dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors? Would they not fear

that citizens, not less tenacious than conscious of their rights, would

flock from the remote extremes of their respective States to the places

of election, to voerthrow their tyrants, and to substitute men who would

be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the people?



PUBLIUS



1. Particularly in the Southern States and in this State.