FEDERALIST No. 85



Concluding Remarks

From MCLEAN's Edition, New York.

Wednesday, May 28, 1788



HAMILTON



To the People of the State of New York:



ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers,

announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for

discussion two points: "the analogy of the proposed government to your

own State constitution," and "the additional security which its adoption

will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to property." But

these heads have been so fully anticipated and exhausted in the progress

of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do any thing more

than repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been heretofore said,

which the advanced stage of the question, and the time already spent

upon it, conspire to forbid.



It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the convention to

the act which organizes the government of this State holds, not less

with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to the real

excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects are the

re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of a council, the omission of

a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision respecting the

liberty of the press. These and several others which have been noted in

the course of our inquiries are as much chargeable on the existing

constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the Union; and a

man must have slender pretensions to consistency, who can rail at the

latter for imperfections which he finds no difficulty in excusing in the

former. Nor indeed can there be a better proof of the insincerity and

affectation of some of the zealous adversaries of the plan of the

convention among us, who profess to be the devoted admirers of the

government under which they live, than the fury with which they have

attacked that plan, for matters in regard to which our own constitution

is equally or perhaps more vulnerable.



The additional securities to republican government, to liberty and to

property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under

consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation

of the Union will impose on local factions and insurrections, and on the

ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who may acquire

credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the

despots of the people; in the diminution of the opportunities to foreign

intrigue, which the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and

facilitate; in the prevention of extensive military establishments,

which could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a

disunited situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of

government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles of

nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition of those

practices on the part of the State governments which have undermined the

foundations of property and credit, have planted mutual distrust in the

breasts of all classes of citizens, and have occasioned an almost

universal prostration of morals.



Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to

myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust at least

you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I gave you

respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be conducted. I

have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and have studiously

avoided those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political

disputants of all parties, and which have been not a little provoked by

the language and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The

charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people, which has

been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, has

something in it too wanton and too malignant, not to excite the

indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of the

calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy,

the well-born, and the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust

of all sensible men. And the unwarrantable concealments and

misrepresentations which have been in various ways practiced to keep the

truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to demand the

reprobation of all honest men. It is not impossible that these

circumstances may have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of

expression which I did not intend; it is certain that I have frequently

felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former

has in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been

neither often nor much.



Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of these

papers, the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily vindicated

from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has not been shown to

be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary to the public safety

and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer these questions to himself,

according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and to act

agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his judgment. This is a

duty from which nothing can give him a dispensation. 'T is one that he

is called upon, nay, constrained by all the obligations that form the

bands of society, to discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial

motive, no particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary

passion or prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his

posterity, an improper election of the part he is to act. Let him beware

of an obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect that the object upon

which he is to decide is not a particular interest of the community, but

the very existence of the nation; and let him remember that a majority

of America has already given its sanction to the plan which he is to

approve or reject.



I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the arguments

which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and that I am

unable to discern any real force in those by which it has been opposed.

I am persuaded that it is the best which our political situation,

habits, and opinions will admit, and superior to any the revolution has

produced.



Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has not a

claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small triumph

to its enemies. "Why," say they, "should we adopt an imperfect thing?

Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is irrevocably

established?" This may be plausible enough, but it is only plausible. In

the first place I remark, that the extent of these concessions has been

greatly exaggerated. They have been stated as amounting to an admission

that the plan is radically defective, and that without material

alterations the rights and the interests of the community cannot be

safely confided to it. This, as far as I have understood the meaning of

those who make the concessions, is an entire perversion of their sense.

No advocate of the measure can be found, who will not declare as his

sentiment, that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part,

is, upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views and

circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one as promises

every species of security which a reasonable people can desire.



I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme of

imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national affairs, and

to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive experiments, in the

chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect

work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all

collective bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of the errors

and prejudices, as of the good sense and wisdom, of the individuals of

whom they are composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen

distinct States in a common bond of amity and union, must as necessarily

be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How

can perfection spring from such materials?



The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately published in

this city,[1] are unanswerable to show the utter improbability of

assembling a new convention, under circumstances in any degree so

favorable to a happy issue, as those in which the late convention met,

deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the arguments there used,

as I presume the production itself has had an extensive circulation. It

is certainly well worthy the perusal of every friend to his country.

There is, however, one point of light in which the subject of amendments

still remains to be considered, and in which it has not yet been

exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first

taking a survey of it in this aspect.



It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it will be

far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to the

Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the present plan, it

becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must undergo a new

decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout the

Union, it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen States. If,

on the contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be ratified by

all the States as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be

effected by nine States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to

nine[2] in favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original

adoption of an entire system.



This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must

inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen

independent States are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions

of interest. We may of course expect to see, in any body of men charged

with its original formation, very different combinations of the parts

upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on one

question, may become the minority on a second, and an association

dissimilar to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the

necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to

compose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the

compact; and hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and

casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The degree

of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number of

particulars and the number of parties.



But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be a

single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would

then be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any

other point -- no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite number

would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently,

whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a

particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There

can, therefore, be no comparison between the facility of affecting an

amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a complete

Constitution.



In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been

urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the national

government will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the

authority of which they were once possessed. For my own part I

acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon

mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the

organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on

this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just

stated. I also think there is little weight in it on another account.

The intrinsic difficulty of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any rate,

independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and

integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the national rulers

the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable

expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a further

consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the

observation is futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever

nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth

article of the plan, the Congres will be obliged "on the application of

the legislatures of two thirds of the States [which at present amount to

nine], to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be

valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when

ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by

conventions in three fourths thereof." The words of this article are

peremptory. The Congress "shall call a convention." Nothing in this

particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of consequence,

all the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes in

air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or

three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which may affect

local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty

in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty or

security of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition of the

State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the

national authority.



If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am myself

deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those rare instances

in which a political truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical

demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same light with me,

however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the propriety

of a previous adoption, as the most direct road to their own object.



The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the

Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to the

truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid and

ingenious: "To balance a large state or society [says he], whether

monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great

difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the

mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many

must unite in the work; EXPERIENCE must guide their labor; TIME must

bring it to perfection, and the FEELING of inconveniences must correct

the mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their first trials and

experiments."[3] These judicious reflections contain a lesson of

moderation to all the sincere lovers of the Union, and ought to put them

upon their guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual

alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the military

despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not

likely to obtain, but from TIME and EXPERIENCE. It may be in me a defect

of political fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an

equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a

longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A NATION,

without a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle. The

establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the

voluntary ocnsent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY, to the completion of

which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to no

rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an

enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States, and after having

passed over so considerable a part of the ground, to recommence the

course. I dread the more the consequences of new attempts, because I

know that POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS, in this and in other States, are enemies

to a general national government in every possible shape.



PUBLIUS



1. Entitled "An Address to the People of the State of New York."



2. It may rather be said TEN, for though two thirds may set on foot the

measure, three fourths must ratify.



3. Hume's Essays, Vol. I, p. 128: "The Rise of Arts and Sciences."